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REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK: CAN THE 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ROE SURVIVE? 
PROFESSOR CHERYL E. AMANA BURRIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
More than forty years since the United States Supreme Court recognized 
a woman’s constitutional right to choose whether or not to terminate a 
pregnancy in the polestar case of Roe v. Wade,1 women’s reproductive 
rights are under attack in ways that are unprecedented.  We see efforts to 
limit access continue at a frightening pace.  From specific restrictions under 
state and federal statutes to ongoing legal challenges, abortion and repro-
ductive rights jurisprudence is being shaped by changes in which the ulti-
mate goal is to ensure that abortion is not an option.  In this article I exam-
ine the evolution of these restrictions and trends, and consider related Su-
preme Court decisions through the 2013 - 2014 session that have added fuel 
to the fire engulfing reproductive rights.2 
Part I of this article provides an overview of cases in abortion jurispru-
dence from Roe through Gonzales.3 Part II examines the continued attacks 
on reproductive choice ranging in form from personhood amendments to 
additional anti-abortion policies. It further considers mandates including 
invasive ultrasounds, increased waiting periods, more extensive counseling 
requirements, restrictions associated with the inception of fetal heartbeat 
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 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (The Court in Roe set forth a trimester framework to deter-
mine when and how the State might regulate the abortion procedure. The Court held that prior to the 
first trimester the abortion decision should be left to the pregnant woman in consultation with her attend-
ing physician. Id. at 163). 
 2. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 3. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
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and fetal pain, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws, 
parental consent/notice requirements, crisis pregnancy centers and defund-
ing of reproductive care providers. Part III provides additional updates on 
legislation and litigation through July 2015.  My conclusion in Part IV 
flows from my belief that the “undue burden” standard set forth in Casey, 4 
despite what promise it may have had, is unworkable. As will be discussed, 
it has mired the courts in the intimate decision making of women and chal-
lenging issues of judicial manageability. It has allowed states to impose 
regulations that completely undermine Roe. Securing the rights by fighting 
state by state and legislature by legislature is not only cost prohibitive for 
women; the defense of the necessary lawsuits also costs the states. The re-
gime thus ties the quality and security of a woman’s right to meaningful 
unobstructed reproductive choice to the state where a woman happens to 
live, or one where she can afford to traverse or visit, harkening to the Pre-
Roe era when safe reproductive choice depended on money and mobility. 
 
We are on the verge of returning to the Pre-Roe days when women had 
little to no right to choose, and navigated in danger, darkness and fear when 
forced to consider abortion as an option. Hard fought gains are slipping 
away. Full female equality and dignity require that a woman control her 
body and make her own non-coerced choices about whether or when she 
will bear children.  We stand at a critical place in time. Will our Constitu-
tional order insure the equal dignity of women; will it provide meaningful 
protection for what have become fragile female rights? I offer what I hope 
are illuminating thoughts for our navigation of a murky post-Roe, post-
Casey, post-Carhart universe. 
I. FROM ROE FORWARD 
In Roe and the companion case of Doe v. Bolton5 the Supreme Court was 
presented with constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion laws 
(from Texas and Georgia respectively). As the court noted, although such 
laws were in effect in a majority of states, they “are of relatively recent vin-
tage,” and the court ultimately found those state statutes to be unconstitu-
                                                                                                                           
 4. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 5. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In this essay, I have not focused at length on the historical 
significance of Roe; however, should a reader wish to learn more concerning pre- and post-Roe jurispru-
dence I would suggest reviewing the works of Professor Reva B. Siegel whose scholarship has been 
consistent and informative for more than several decades. (See, e.g.,Reva Siegel Reasoning from the 
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Question of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 261 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, Abortion and the “Women Question”: Forty Years of Debate, 89 IND. 
L.J. 1365 (2012); and LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPE 
THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULINg (2d. ed. 2012). 
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tional.6  After considering the works of philosophers, theologians, and 
common law scholars, among others,7 the court concluded that the decision 
to have an abortion was protected in the right of personal privacy.8 This 
right, though unenumerated, is encompassed in the penumbra of rights first 
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.9 The trimester framework set forth 
in Roe prohibited state interference with a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy during the first trimester.10 State regulations “reasonably related 
to maternal health” were permissible after the first trimester11 and the 
State’s interest in potential life is so compelling at viability that the State 
may go so far as to proscribe abortion.12 
The Court’s decision in Roe was met with a variety of hostile reactions.  
For example, the Hyde Amendment was passed and sustained, resulting in a 
prohibition on use of federal funds to pay for abortions other than to pre-
serve a woman’s life or in cases of incest or rape.13  Versions of this 
amendment governing state funds were enacted in a majority of states.14 
Parental consent statutes were first upheld in Bellotti v. Baird,15 and like-
wise were enacted in a majority of states.16 
It was clear from the decision in Roe that the right to an abortion was nei-
ther absolute nor without limitation. The parameters of permissible limita-
tions were tested in a number of cases that followed. For example, three 
years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld an informed consent provision applicable to all abortions 
                                                                                                                           
 6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129. 
 7. See, Id. at 131—37. 
 8. Id. at 154. 
 9. See, Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Appellant Griswold, executive director of Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut, and appellant Buxton, medical director, challenged a Connecticut 
statute prohibiting dissemination of information about and use of birth control by married couples. The 
appellants were arrested for providing instruction and medical advice in violation of §§ 53-32 & 54-196 
of the statute.  This criminal statute was determined to be unconstitutional and the recognition of the Bill 
of Rights having a “penumbra” of guarantees emanating was recognized for the first time. These guaran-
tees encompass the right to marital privacy.). 
 10. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Social Security Act §§ 1901 et seq., 1902(a)(1, 17) as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396 et seq., 
1396b(a)(1, 17)(2014); see Beale v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); 
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (all supporting states’ decisions not to provide Medicaid funds for 
nontherapeutic abortions); and  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (sustaining the Hyde amend-
ment). 
 14. See e.g. Humphreys v. Clinic for Women, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. 2003) (holding that states 
do not have to fund all medically necessary abortions so long as Medicaid funds abortions in cases of 
rape, incest, serious risk of impairment of bodily functions or risk to life). 
 15. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). (Just about every state has adopted such a requirement 
which is consistently upheld provided that there is a judicial bypass option for the minor.) (See infra 
discussion in section II E). 
 16. Id. 
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including those in the first trimester.17  Throughout the 1980s, challenges 
were brought and restrictions sought with varying degrees of success.18  
The court in Akron I, determined that section 1870.06(B) of the Akron mu-
nicipal ordinance was unconstitutional.19 It is interesting that some of the 
concerns expressed in Akron about coercive information being provided 
and justified as being necessary to ensure informed consent remain relevant 
and controversial today.20 
On at least two occasions anti-Roe constituencies anticipated that the 
Court would overturn Roe.  In Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,21 the court 
failed to overturn Roe, but did allow Missouri in its preamble, to define life 
as beginning at conception 22 Moreover, it upheld a statute prohibiting the 
use of public hospitals and medical staff in the performance of abortions.23   
Even more importantly, it clearly articulated a State’s compelling interest in 
                                                                                                                           
 17. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (The court was concerned 
that a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy be made knowingly and is uncoerced; thus written 
consent was considered useful provided that it did not interfere with the choice. The court explained 
“the decision to abort…is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that 
it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily con-
cerned, and her awareness of the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the 
State to the extent of requiring her prior written consent.” Id. at 67. 
 18. See, e.g. Planned Parenthood of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding , inter 
alia, the requirement for a second physician at post-viability abortions. Id.); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. 
For Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (in which three informed consent requirements were 
found unconstitutional at 443—49, as was a requirement for hospitalization for second and third tri-
mester abortions at 438—39; ). In Akron the court recognized the invasive regulations for what they 
were. i.e. attempts to prevent a woman from exercising the right to decide whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy. In Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health (Akron II) 497 U.S. 502 (1990) seeds for 
informed consent laws were sown and have borne fruit in the form of unprecedented informed consent 
requirements enacted in a number of states from 2010 forward. (see parts II & III of this article). For an 
informative discussion, including the historical context, of Akron I & II see Tracy A. Thomas, Back to 
the Future of Regulating Abortion in the First Term, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 47 (2014); compare 
also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking re-
quirements that doctors report medical information, identifying information and reasons for performance 
of post-viability abortions. Id. at 765—68). 
 19. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444. (The court concluded that the regulations, under the guise of 
informed consent, were extending the State’s interest beyond permissible limits. “…the information 
required is designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it alto-
gether…Moreover, much of the detailed description of ‘the anatomical and physiological characteristics 
of the particular unborn child’ …would involve at best speculation by the physician…and physical and 
psychological complications of abortions is a ‘parade of horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a 
particularly dangerous procedure.”) 
 20. See, e.g. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.82(1)-(2) (2014) (adopted as the Woman’s Right to Know 
Act) (requiring physicians to among other things display a sonogram and describe the fetus even if the 
woman refuses to see or hear (enforcement enjoined 12/22/2014)); and Tex. Med. Providers Performing 
Abortion  Serv. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Tex.  2011) (finding mandatory ultrasound and 
display law violates free speech rights of doctors and patients). 
 21. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 22. Id. at 501. 
 23. Id. at 511. 
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potential life for the duration of one’s pregnancy, not just at viability.24 This 
decision certainly laid the foundation for the concept of “personhood” that 
came to fruition in the plethora of amendments, statutes and ballot initia-
tives put forth from 2008 to the present.25 
By 1992, when the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey26, there was a concern that the court would take 
this opportunity to finally repeal Roe.27  The Court did not do so; however, 
it did, in reaffirming Roe, reject the Roe trimester framework28. Casey sig-
nificantly changed the protections set forth in Roe in at least two ways. The 
Court replaced the trimester framework with an “undue burden” standard.29 
That standard, to this day, remains unclear and ambiguous.  The Court 
states “[a] finding of an undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a 
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”30 The Court 
placed additional emphasis on a State’s “important and legitimate interest in 
protecting the potentiality of human life.”31 As it had in Webster, the Court 
finds this interest compelling throughout one’s pregnancy.  The State is in a 
position to implement restrictions that may be hostile to abortion rights 
throughout all stages of one’s pregnancy. The language used in Casey 
opened the door for legislatures to restrict access by regulating clinics, as 
well as qualifications for persons performing abortions and to require pro-
cedures such as ultrasounds and provision of biased information under the 
guise of informed consent, with the clear goal of discouraging abortion.32 
                                                                                                                           
 24. Id. at 494. 
 25. See infra discussion at II A. 
 26. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 27. The concern was foreshadowed by Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Webster. Stating 
that the plurality had essentially “invite[d] every state to enact more and more restrictive regulations… 
[that] will return the law of procreative freedom to the severe limitations that generally prevailed in this 
country before January 22, 1973.” Webster. 492 U.S. at 538, he continued with “…[f]or today, the 
women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the signs are evident and very 
ominous, and a chill wind blows.” Id. at 560. (From Webster on state legislatures accepted that invita-
tion.)  
 28. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876—77. 
 29. Id. At 837. 
 30. Id. at 877 (The court then went on to conclude that provisions such as the statute’s definition 
of medical emergency, informed consent requirements and a 24—hour waiting period do not constitute 
an undue burden. Ultimately the only provision found to constitute an undue burden was the spousal 
notification requirement. Id. at 877—91). 
 31. Id. at 871 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 162). 
 32. For example, the Task Force on Abortion in South Dakota, was instrumental in South Dakota’s 
enactment of H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005) and provided substantial support for the 
language used in crafting that bill as well as H.B. 1233 its companion bill. Under the legislation, doctors 
are required to provide information indicating that there is a causal link between abortion and suicide. 
There is no such causal link. See Spurious Science Trumps as U.S. Court Upholds South Dakota “Sui-
cide Advisory” Law, GUTTMACHER INST., (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/07/27/index.html. See also section II C of this article. 
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Even so the Court was clear that in determining the constitutionality of re-
strictions, the proper measure should be the restrictions “impact on those 
whose conduct it affects.”33Abortion is incorporated in one’s fundamental 
reproductive rights; therefore, abortion restrictions should be examined 
using a strict scrutiny analysis. It is unclear how using an “undue burden” 
analysis comports with strict scrutiny. 
After the Casey decision, abortion opponents seemed to modify strategies 
from focusing on repealing Roe, to enacting regulations using the language 
set forth in Casey to make access to abortion near impossible.  The opinion 
in Gonzales v. Carhart34set the stage for the tactics of eliminating/reducing 
access via regulation of the process. This case challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Partial—Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.35 The court found that 
the act was constitutional in a 5—4 decision, holding that the act did not 
constitute an “undue burden” on the right to terminate a pregnancy.36 
Moreover, a majority of the court found that a health exception to the pro-
hibition of dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortions was not needed since 
“whether the act creates significant health risks for women has been a con-
tested factual question.”37 The court devoted some time detailing “docu-
mented medical disagreement” about whether the prohibition would ever 
“impose significant health risks on women.”38  Gonzales served as a vehicle 
for abortion opponents to expand regulations that had been facilitated by 
Casey to new levels. The language used in Gonzales has been used subse-
quently to support all manner of TRAP laws.39 It also provides support for 
states promulgating laws based on notions that abortions have a negative 
impact on women’s health both physically and mentally and thus are neces-
sary to protect a woman’s health. Women—protective antiabortion argu-
ments had been percolating from the early 1990s on.40  Justice Kennedy’s 
words can be interpreted as suggesting some support for such arguments. 
He posits “Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond 
                                                                                                                           
 33. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 (the Court makes clear that “the means chosen by the State to further 
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s choice not hinder it.” Id. at 877. 
 34. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124 (2007). 
 35. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 1, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201 
(2003)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003)). 
 36. Gonzales, 550 U.S.at 160—61. 
 37. Id. at 161. 
 38. See opinion id. at 161—67. 
 39. See discussion at section II D infra. 
 40. See, e.g. David C. Reardon, Politically Correct vs. Politically Smart: Why Politicians Should 
Be Both Pro-Woman and Pro-Life, AFTERABORTION.ORG (Nov. 10, 1994), 
http://www.afterabortion.info/PAR/V2/n3/PROWOMAN.htm and Pro-Woman/Pro-Life Campaign, 
AFTERABORTION.ORG (Mar.  23, 1993), http://www.afterabortion.info/PAR/V1/n1/prowoman.htm. 
(For background on David Reardon see Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict 
and the Spread of Woman-Protective Anti-Abortion Arguments, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1672—76 (2008). 
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of love the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as 
well…While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to 
abort the infant life they once created and sustained”.41 The Justice’s con-
cerns seem unfounded. Leaders in the field of medicine have concluded that 
there is no such thing as “post-abortion syndrome.”42  Still some states re-
quire that unproven, inaccurate information is provided to women consider-
ing abortion.43 In upholding the Partial Birth Abortion Act, Gonzales also 
opened the door to arguments for fetal personhood and fetal pain by con-
cluding that the Partial Birth Abortion Act “appl[ied] [to] both pre-viability 
and post-viability because, by common understanding and scientific termi-
nology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not 
it is viable outside [of] the womb.”44  The resulting restrictions and attempt-
ed restrictions could be anticipated by such language. Thus from 2010 to 
the present (2015), state legislatures sought and implemented major re-
strictions on both procedures and access to abortion and reproductive health 
care.45 
                                                                                                                           
 41. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (the justice seems to have been swayed by an amicus brief, referenc-
ing  Brief for Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in no. 05-380, pp.22-24 indicating “severe depression 
and loss of esteem can follow. See ibid”). 
 42. See Abortion Myths: Post-Abortion Syndrome, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 
http://prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/about-abortion/abortion-myths/ (last visited Mar. 17,2015) 
(a 1989 report of the American Psychological Association from a panel of psychologist who reviewed 
the top studies on post-abortion syndrome and found no evidence of such a syndrome). 
 43. For example, according to Guttmacher Institute updates, in nine of twenty-two states requiring 
providers to talk about the psychological response to abortion and how a woman is likely to feel after-
wards, only negative responses are stressed despite evidence that some women feel relief  (Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and West Virginia); in five 
states women must be given inaccurate information about the impact of abortion on future fertility 
(Arizona, Kansas, South Dakota, Texas and West Virginia); in five states women are told having an 
abortion increases their risk of breast cancer, a fact that has been definitively refuted by the National 
Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health (Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Texas). 
See State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods For Abortion, Guttmacher Inst. (Mar. 1, 
2015) http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf. 
 44. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147; see also discussion II C infra. 
 45. The latitude expanded using Casey and Gonzales was further supported by the political shift 
exhibited by the 2010 midterm elections. The Republican platform has opposed abortion over multiple 
election cycles. The 2012 platform explicitly states “Numerous studies have shown that abortion endan-
gers the health and well-being of women and we stand firmly against it.” See 2012 Republican Party 
Platform, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 27, 2012) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101961. The most recent 2014 midterm elections 
offer little hope that the onslaught of restrictions will abate. 
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II.  REGULATIONS CONSIDERED AND ENACTED 
More abortion legislation was enacted between 2011 and 2013 than dur-
ing the entire previous decade.46 In 2011, ninety-two abortion restrictions 
were enacted.47 Forty-three provisions seeking to restrict access to abortion 
services were enacted in 2012, and forty-three additional restrictions were 
enacted by the middle of 2013.48 During 2014 abortion bans to replace Roe 
were enacted in seventeen states.49 A patchwork of laws regulate and limit 
whether, when and under what circumstances a woman may obtain an abor-
tion. Restrictions are seen in a variety of forms including “Personhood 
Amendments,” Early Abortion Bans, Limits under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), Limitation to Access using Targeted Restrictions on Abortion Pro-
viders (TRAP) laws, Mandatory Counseling and Ultrasound Require-
ments.50 These strategies will be discussed in this section. 
                                                                                                                           
 46. See More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011—2013 Than in the Entire Previ-
ous Decade, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2014) http://guttmacher.org/media/inthe 
news/2014/01/02/index.html. 
 47. Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2012 State Policy Review, GUTTMACHER 
INST., http://guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2012/statetrends42012.html (last visited Mar. 18, 
2015). 
 48. State Level Assault on Abortion Rights Continues in First Half of 2013, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (July 8, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2013/07/08/. 
 49. Bills were introduced in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington and 
West Virginia. The house in Alabama passed a bill that would ban abortion after a heartbeat is detected 
(no further action is expected since the legislature adjourned its regular session.); an Arkansas ban on 
abortion after 12 weeks of pregnancy was struck down in March (see note 69 infra). Such a pre viability 
restriction clearly conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court rulings; in Louisiana a measure has been enacted 
requiring the continuation of life support for a pregnant woman at 20 weeks post fertilization or later to 
allow the fetus to develop until live birth; the U.S. District Court in North Dakota blocked enforcement 
of a law passed in 2013 banning abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected (see note 68 infra), the law 
was found to be unconstitutional and in violation of the precedent set forth in Roe which provides a 
woman with the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability. See Monthly State Update: 
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 2015, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2015), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/index.html 
 50. The Americans United for Life (AUL) has been instrumental in providing support for pro life 
legislatures. They describe their strategies and the success they have been seeing in their document 
“Defending Life”. (“[M]ore pro-life laws are in effect than ever before, life affirming legislation contin-
ues to be introduced in record numbers in a majority of states…AUL actively pursues a strategy of 
accumulated victories, advocating the systemic and persistent adoption and implementation of life 
affirming laws….We provide…lawmakers…proven legal strategies and tools that will…state by state, 
lead to a more pro-life America and help set the stage for the state-by-state battle that will follow Roe’s 
ultimate reversal.” Americans United for Life, DEFENDING LIFE 2013 55-56 (Denise M. Burke ed., 
2013). 
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A. Personhood Amendments 
Although the Supreme Court in Roe refused to define the point at which 
one becomes a person51, personhood amendments are seen in a number of 
variations, from amendments to state constitutions to state statutes. The 
most extreme ballot initiatives52 would define life as beginning at concep-
tion and thus would prohibit not only abortions, but also some forms of 
birth control.53  The intent of these amendments is to challenge the core 
premise set forth in Roe that the fetus is not a person.54 Thus far, the voters 
in their respective states have defeated the initiatives, or initiative support-
ers have not successfully gathered sufficient support to get them on the bal-
lot.55 As mentioned in discussing Webster56 Missouri defines life as begin-
ning at conception in the preamble to its constitution. It is among eight 
states that express their intent to restrict the right to legal abortion to the 
maximum extent permitted in the absence of Roe.57 Statutes which define 
life/personhood as beginning at conception have been proposed in other 
states.58  North Dakota sought to become the first state to pass a “fetal per-
sonhood amendment” that would provide protection to a fertilized egg.59 
                                                                                                                           
 51. Justice Blackmun asserted “We need not resolve the difficult question of when life be-
gins…the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to specu-
late as to the answer. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
 52. See e.g. Act offered Jan. 11, 2012, H.B. No. 1 (Va. 2012) (bill to construe the word “person” to 
include unborn children); H.B. 531, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va.) 2014. 
 53. See e.g., Act effective July 1, 2015, H.B. 1309, 113th Leg. Sess. (Miss. 2015), (voted on in the 
fall of 2011); Florida, H.B. 395, 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); Katie Sanders, Personhood Florida Aims 
to Mimic Mississippi’s Amendment Push, Politics, MCCLATCHY DC. Nov. 8, 2011, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/11/08/129628/florida-group-aims-to-mimic-mississippis.html (alt-
hough the anti-abortion group Personhood USA failed to gather enough signatures for the 2012 and 
2014 ballots they have not given up); Bruce Finley, Abortion Foes to Try Again to Pass Personhood 
Amendment in Colorado, THE DENVER POST (Nov. 21, 2011) 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_19380916?source=rss#sthash.76sY1rCO.dpuf; 2012 Ballot Issues, 
MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/2012/BallotIssues/#BallotIssue6 
(last visted Mar. 17,2015). 
 54. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (“…the word ‘person’ as used in the 14th amendment, does not include 
the unborn.”) 
 55. See Florida, H.B. 395, 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); Aaron Blake, Anti-Abortion ‘Personhood’ 
Amendment Fails in Mississippi, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 8 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/anti-abortion-personhood-amendment-fails-in-
mississippi/2011/11/08/gIQASRPd3M_blog.html (in Colorado voters rejected a personhood amendment 
on the 2008, and 2010 ballots by a 3-1 margin and it was defeated again in 2014; in Montana the secre-
tary of state approved the petition for signature gathering but no amendment has been enacted). 
 56. Webster, 492 U.S. at 501; see also supra text accompanying notes 21-25. 
 57. State Policies in Brief, Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe, GUTTMACHER INST., (Jan. 1, 
2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib.pdf. 
 58. H.B.  490, 62nd Leg., 2011 Sess. (Mont. 2011) (defining a person as of the moment of concep-
tion); H.B. 1450, 62 Leg., 2011 Sess. (N.D. 2011) (defining person as “individual member[s] of the 
species homo sapiens at every stage of development.”); H.B. 1571, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 
2011)(defining as a person “a human being at all stages of human development of life, including the 
state of fertilization or conception, regardless of age, health, level of functioning, or condition of de-
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Personhood is also implicated in both criminal and tort law. In criminal 
law, the doctrine evolved from finding criminal homicide only if the fetus 
died after birth (the “born alive” view).60 Under the modern trend, states 
have moved away from strict application of the born alive rule and will 
allow findings of homicide even without a live birth. As the doctrine 
evolved, there was initially a requirement for viability. Yet some jurisdic-
tions have allowed a cause of action even pre-viability. At the federal level, 
Congress amended federal criminal law with what has commonly been re-
ferred to as “Laci and Connor’s Law” or the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act (UVVA).61 This law makes it a crime to kill or injure a fetus during the 
commission of a crime against a pregnant woman. In essence, the law clas-
sifies the fetus or embryo as a legal person deserving of its own protection 
under criminal law.  The statute defines an unborn child as “a member of 
the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the 
womb.”62 This recognition and protection is on its face in conflict with Roe 
which specifically states “…that the word ‘person’ as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”63 The majority of States 
had already enacted homicide laws that recognized unborn victims, most 
providing protection regardless of the stage of prenatal development.64 
                                                                                                                           
pendency.”); H.B. 1440, 2011 Sess. (Va. 2011)defining life as beginning at conception and an unborn 
child as “children or the offspring of children of human beings from the moment of conception until 
birth at every stage of biological development.”); Note that a Virginia legislator introduced a person-
hood bill at the federal level.  See Anita Kumar, Lawmaker files “personhood bill” in the House, The 
Washington Post, Nov. 9 2011. 
 59. See Mira Oberman, North Dakota Now Has the Toughest Restrictions in the Country, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/north-dakota-
introduces-toughest-abortion-laws-in-the-country-2013-3. 
 60. If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth in her wombe; or if a 
man beat her, whereby the childe deth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great 
misprision, and no murder; but if the childe be born alive and deth of a potion, battery or other cause, 
this is murder… See William E. Buelow III, To Be and Not to Be: Inconsistencies in the Law Regarding 
the Legal Status of the Unborn Fetus, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 963, 972 (1998) (quoting 3 Coke, Institutes 50 
(1648). 
 61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004). This law was so named for Laci Peterson who was pregnant with 
Connor at the time she disappeared. Her husband, Scott Peterson, was later convicted of her murder. For 
more details regarding the Peterson case see http://www.scottpetersonappeal.org/.  (Note that the South 
Dakota legislature enacted House Bill 1166 requiring patients to sign a statement indicating “[t]hat 
abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.” S.D.C.L. §34-23A-
10.1(b)-(d) (2011). South Dakota also enacted “The Women’s Health and Human Life Protection Act 
2006”  H.B. 1215  SD (2006), which attempted to ban all abortions with the limited exception “to pre-
vent the death of a pregnant mother.”  This statute was defeated by referendum Nov. 7, 2006 (56 to 
44%). To this extent, South Dakota was at the forefront of personhood amendments. 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2014). 
 63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (but again cf. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506). 
 64. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-1102 (2014); GA CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (2006); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-4003 (2014); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/ 9-1.2  (2014); KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 
507A.0303 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:8 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (2014); 
MINN. STAT. § 609.2661 (2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 
(2014); and NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-391 (2014). 
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In the context of tort law, the idea that prenatal injuries could not support 
a cause of action persisted until at least 1946.65 States today have moved 
well beyond a born alive analysis and will allow recovery for wrongful 
death regardless of whether a fetus is viable or not.66 
Consistent with the notion that prohibition of abortion is warranted, if not 
at conception, then at least as early in fetal development as possible, a 
number of states have sought to enact “fetal heartbeat” bills. The first state 
to consider such a bill was Ohio.67 These bills, while not technically a total 
ban on abortion, could outlaw abortion in most circumstances since a fetal 
heartbeat can be detected as early as five weeks of gestation. Using the no-
tion of fetal heart beat, North Dakota attempted to prohibit abortions as 
early as five weeks.68 Other states have followed or attempted to follow 
suit.69 
Closely related to the fetal heartbeat bills are attempts to move the point 
of viability back as far as possible and the attempt to ban abortions on the 
basis of fetal pain.  States have attempted to prohibit abortions well before 
any point of viability. A number of states have enacted laws that are clearly 
unconstitutional under existing laws. Although there is no argument that a 
fetus is not viable at twelve weeks, over eighteen states have enacted stat-
utes that would ban abortions before viability.70 
Fetal pain laws are based on the premise that a fetus feels pain upon ad-
ministration of stimuli by at least twenty weeks of gestation if not sooner. 
                                                                                                                           
 65. Buelow, supra note 60, at 979. 
 66. Consistent with its view in Webster, Missouri was among the first states to adopt this position. 
See Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995), others adopting this view include Alabama, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota and West Virginia. For more on states that allow wrongful 
death suits that may or may not be tied to viability see Sheryl A. Symonds, Wrongful Death of the Fe-
tus: Viability is Not a Viable Distinction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 103 (1984). 
 67. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (as passed by Ohio house, June 28, 
2011) Although the bill passed the house, it was not pursued in the Senate; Ann Sanner, Ohio Senate 
Puts End to “Heartbeat” Abortion Bill, Salon (Nov. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/ohio-senate-puts-end-to-heartbeat-abortion-bill-1.353376. see 
also Jessica L. Knopp, The Unconstitutionality of Ohio House Bill 124: The Heartbeat Bill, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 253 (2013). 
 68. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-1-05.2 (2013) (banning abortion after detection of a heartbeat; see 
also MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 855 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 2014). 
 69. Ark. Code. Ann § 20-16-13 (2013) (amending to add the Arkansas Human Heartbeat Protec-
tion Act, which prohibits abortion at twelve weeks if heartbeat detected in abdominal ultrasound); Ed-
wards v. Beck, 946 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Ark. 2013); see also S.B. 96, 121st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. 
(S.C. 2015); A.B. 8947,237th Gen. Assemb. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); H.B. 5644, 97th Gen. Assemb. Reg. 
Sess. (MI. 2013); H.B. 490, 2014 Leg. Reg. Sess. (AL. 2014); S.B. 2807, 129th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. 
(MS. 2014); H.R. 7330, 2014 Leg. Sess. (2013); H.B. 5463, 98th Gen. Assemb. Sec. Reg. Sess. (I.L. 
2013) (all addressing fetal heartbeat legislation in 2014). 
 70. See Guttmacher supra note 49 (Alabama. Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklaho-
ma, West Virginia and Wisconsin all banning abortions prior to viability.) 
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There is substantial disagreement on this point.71  The idea that a fetus can 
feel pain has been promulgated by a number of scholars, yet there is little 
support for this position.72 A 2005 review of the medical literature by the 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) seems to refute 
claims that a fetus feels pain at twenty weeks. The article states: 
Pain is an emotional and psychological experience that requires conscious 
recognition of a noxious stimulus. Consequently, the capacity for con-
scious perception of pain can rise only after thalamocortical pathways 
begin to function, which may occur in the third trimester around 29 to 30 
weeks’ gestational age, based on the limited data available. Small scale 
histological studies of human fetuses have found that thalamocortical fi-
bers begin to form between 23 and 30 weeks’ gestational age, but these 
studies did not specifically examine thalamocortical pathways active in 
pain perception.73 
Nevertheless, as discussed above,74 Gonzales provided the impetus for 
states to pass more restrictive laws based on all aspects of personhood, in-
cluding fetal pain. In addition to exemplifying fetal heartbeat laws, North 
Dakota laws are also illustrative of fetal pain laws.75 States including North 
Carolina prohibit abortions at twenty weeks gestation on the theory that 
fetuses experience pain.76 Nebraska enacted a bill prohibiting pre-viability 
abortion using fetal pain as a justification.77 Pre-viable fetal pain laws, if 
enforced, severely burden a pregnant woman’s choice on whether to con-
tinue or terminate her pregnancy. 
                                                                                                                           
 71. Denise Grady, Study Finds 29-Week Fetuses Probably Feel No Pain and Need No Anesthesia, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 24, 2005) http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/health/24fetus.html; Texas: Pro-Life 
Side Wins Debate Over Fetal-Pain Abortion Ban, (Mar. 18, 2013) 
http://www.lifetimes.com/2013/04/18/texas-pro-life-side-wins-debate-over-fetal-pain-abortion-ban/. 
 72. John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability and Early 
Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327,368 (2011). 
 73. Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 294 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 947 (2005) available at http;//jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=201429; 
see also Fetus Can’t Feel Pain Before 24 Weeks, Study Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 25, 2010), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37920310/. 
 74. Gonzales and discussion supra notes 34-44. 
 75. James MacPherson, North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill Passes House, Sent to Governor Jack Dal-
rymple, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2013, 4:51 PM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/12/north-dakota-fetal-pain_n_3071760.html. 
 76. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45.1 (2013); other states include Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kansas, and Louisiana; ALA. CODE 1975 § 26-23B-5 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301 (2014); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-608 (2014) (unconstitutionally preempted by McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(B)(6)(WEST 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1299.35.2 (2014). 
 77. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-3-102-111 (2010) (the sponsors of the bill admitted that it was intend-
ed as a challenge to Roe v. Wade). 
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B. Mandatory Ultrasounds and Informed Consent 
Closely related to the “fetal heartbeat” and “fetal pain” bills are the man-
datory ultra sound bills.78  States have attempted to make ultrasounds a part 
of abortion services since the early 1990s.  Even though routine ultrasounds 
are not considered medically necessary as a component of first trimester 
abortion, the requirement is becoming more and more common.79  Ultra-
sounds are regulated in twenty-three states.80 Transvaginal ultrasounds have 
been especially controversial. They have been particularly popular as states 
enact fetal heart beat legislation since they are the means needed to detect a 
fetal heart beat during the first trimester of one’s pregnancy.  Ultrasounds 
are commonly used by an obstetrician to determine the date of pregnancy.81 
Proponents of mandatory ultrasounds argue that the information provided 
to the pregnant woman will insure that she is making an informed choice on 
whether to terminate her pregnancy.  Instead of being used in a manner that 
facilitates informed choice, however, they are more likely to be used in an 
attempt to discourage or reduce abortions.  The ultrasound procedure is 
mandated whether a doctor believes it is medically necessary or not82 and 
without consideration of the increased cost for the procedure or the undue 
burden on one’s ability to terminate a pregnancy. Because a number of the 
ultrasound laws also require the physician to describe with specificity and 
                                                                                                                           
 78. Ultrasound requirements are in place in the following states: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
390.0111 (WEST 2014); Indiana, IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1 (WEST 2014); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
65-6709 (WEST 2014) North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21 et seq. (2014); Texas, Informed Con-
sent to Abortion Act, §§ 33.001-011, 101.003 et seq. (Vernon, Westlaw through the end of 2013 3rd 
called Sess. of 83rd Legislature); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 63 § 1-746.1 et seq. (2014); Utah, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (2014) (allows provider to waive under certain circumstances). Although 
the states have been inconsistent concerning the validity of mandatory ultrasounds, the trend seems to be 
decidedly towards enforcement and disclosure of findings. Tex. Med. Providers performing Abortion 
Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d  942 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (declaring mandatory ultrasound law unconsti-
tutional), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding the mandatory ultrasound law) even 
on remand the court asserted that the intent of the legislature in enacting the requirement was to discour-
age women from exercising their constitutional right by making it more difficult for caring and compe-
tent physicians to perform abortions, finding that mandatory ultrasound and display law violates free 
speech rights of doctors and patients); Lakey No. A-11-A-CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132 at*5 (W.D. 
Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (reluctantly enforcing); see also Jim Vertuno, Federal Judge Rejects Major Parts of 
New Texas Law on Sonograms and Abortions, AP (Aug. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44334105/ns/us_news-life/#.Um_E4_msiyM. 
 79. See Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound (2015), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibRFU.pdf 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Robertson supra note 72 at 347. 
 82. See Guttmacher supra note 79. The report indicates 12 states require verbal counseling or 
written materials: Georgia, Indiana and Utah require verbal; Kansas, Michigan (included in materials, 
although not mandated), Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia require written; Nebras-
ka, Oklahoma and Wisconsin require verbal and written materials. 
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use visual imagery, the laws have been challenged as violative of the first 
amendment on the grounds that they compel speech.83 
Professor Carol Sanger argues that requiring ultrasounds as a precondi-
tion of abortion is intended to make the abortion decision more difficult for 
women.  “[Mandatory ultrasound is] a fortuitous combination of imagery, 
imagination and ideology…harassment masquerading as information.”84At 
least three states (Texas, Oklahoma and North Carolina) have had mandato-
ry ultrasound laws challenged. The law challenged in Texas, S.B. 16/H.B. 
15, requires the physician “who is to perform an abortion” to display a so-
nogram of the fetus to the woman, while describing the images to her and 
making the heartbeat audible to her.85  The law was challenged in federal 
court, where the court upheld the law, rejecting concerns about medical 
necessity or deference to the doctor’s medical judgment.86 The Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma permanently enjoined its proposed mandatory ultra-
sound law.87 
In North Carolina, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
North Carolina enjoined two provisions of the North Carolina law, one re-
quiring the provider to describe the image and the other requiring the pro-
vider to offer a woman an opportunity to hear the fetal heartbeat.88 Noting 
that the act went “well beyond requiring disclosure of those items tradition-
ally a part of the informed consent process, which include in this context 
the nature and risks of the procedure and the gestational age of the fetus”89, 
the court concluded that the State failed to show that such requirements 
furthered a compelling state interest in protecting the patients from psycho-
                                                                                                                           
 83. Three states (Louisiana, Texas and Wisconsin) require that the provider perform an ultrasound 
and show and describe the image. A woman is allowed to look away; 10 states (Alabama, Arizona, 
Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia) require the pro-
vider to offer the woman the opportunity to view the image. 9 states (Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Michi-
gan, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah and West Virginia) require the provider who performs an 
ultrasound in preparation for an abortion to offer the woman an opportunity to view the image and 5 
states (Idaho, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota and Utah) require that a woman be given an oppor-
tunity to view an ultrasound image. The requirement has been enjoined in North Carolina and Oklaho-
ma. 
 84. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected 
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351,358 (2008). 
 85. See H.B. 15, 2011 Leg., 82nd Sess. (Tex.2011) (this bill states in part that the physician per-
forming the abortion provide “in a manner understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of the 
results of the sonogram images, including a medical description of the dimensions of the embryo or 
fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of external members and internal organs”). 
 86. See Tex. Med. Providers performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 579-80 (5th Cir. 
2012). (Louisiana, also in the Fifth Circuit, quickly passed its own mandatory ultrasound law LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §  40:1299.35.2 (2014). 
 87. Okla. Coal. For Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27 (Okla. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
2887 (2013) (no. 12-1094) cert. dismissed, 292 P.3d 27 (2013). 
 88. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F Supp 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011) enjoining enforcement of N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 90-21.85. 
 89. Id. at 431. 
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logical/emotional distress or in preventing women from being coerced into 
having an abortion.90 
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in consider-
ing challenges to this same act, affirmed the district court’s holding that N. 
C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.85(b) violated the First Amendment. The court held 
that the “Women’s Right to Know Act”, which was passed in 2011 over a 
gubernatorial veto, resulted in compelled speech and as such was not con-
stitutional.91 The court opined, in sum, “though the State would have us 
view this provision as simply a reasonable regulation of the medical profes-
sion, these requirements look nothing like traditional informed consent, or 
even the versions provided in Casey and in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.82. As 
such, they impose an extraordinary burden on expressive rights.”92 Given 
the inconsistency of outcomes among the circuits, it appears that the Su-
preme Court will ultimately determine the validity of mandatory ultra-
sounds. Unfortunately, as discussed above, the Court’s language in Gonza-
les would seem to support an extreme interpretation of informed consent 
rather than a reasonable one. 
C. Mandatory Counseling and Informed Consent 
The principle of informed consent has its roots in the English common 
law.93 Under the doctrine, administering medical treatment without first 
obtaining the patient’s consent was considered a form of battery.94 The fun-
damentals of the concept as exemplified in American jurisprudence include 
the notion “that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his own body….’ True consent 
to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and 
                                                                                                                           
 90. Id. at 432. 
 91. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 83 
U.S.L.W. 3901 (July 2015) 
 92. Id. at 254. (In a well reasoned decision the court further concluded that the challenged ele-
ments (requiring a physician to speak to a patient who is not listening, rendering the physician a mouth 
piece of the state’s message, and omitting a therapeutic privilege to protect the health of the patient) 
markedly depart from standard medical practice. Id.) 
 93. See Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 605 (Cal. 1993) (imposing a duty for physicians to dis-
close “material risks” regarding medical procedures). 
 94. See e.g. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) “[n]o right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the pos-
session and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear 
and unquestionable authority of law.” 
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the risks attendant upon each.”95 Challenges based on Informed consent 
date back to the early 1900s.96 
One of the provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 
at issue in Casey involved informed consent.97  The informed consent pro-
vision required that at least twenty-four hours prior to performance of the 
abortion a physician inform the woman about, inter alia, risks of the proce-
dure and of childbirth, availability of printed materials published by the 
State describing the fetus, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and 
other services as alternatives to abortion.98 The woman must certify in writ-
ing that she has been informed of the availability of the printed materials 
and been provided them if she chooses to view them.99  In holding that the 
informed consent requirements did not constitute an undue burden or sub-
stantial obstacle to a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate a preg-
nancy, the Court concluded that “the State had a ‘legitimate purpose of re-
ducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, 
with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not 
fully informed.”100  It was clear from the Court’s opinion, however, that 
information provided under the premise of informed consent should be 
“truthful” and “not misleading.”101 
Despite the fact that informed consent is an accepted doctrine and recog-
nized in every state, thirty-five states have fashioned additional mandatory 
counseling requirements, mandatory delays or both under the guise of en-
suring that one’s decision to seek an abortion is informed.102  As with Per-
sonhood Amendments,103 South Dakota was among the first to enact such 
informed consent provisions. Its “ACT” contained four major provisions: 
the Pregnancy Help Center Requirement; the Seventy-two—hour Waiting 
Period Requirement; the Risk Factors Requirement and the Coercion Provi-
sion.104  Some of the counseling required under the Act can easily be de-
                                                                                                                           
 95. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
 96. Id. at 779; See, e.g., Theodore v. Ellis, 75 So. 655, 660 (La. 1917); Hunter v. Burroughs, 96 
S.E. 360, 366-68 (Va. 1918). 
 97. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 881. 
 100. Id. at 882. 
 101. Id. “If the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not 
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.” Id. 
 102. State Policies Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 
1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf.] 
 103. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57. 
 104. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2011). The Pregnancy Help Center Requirement pro-
vides that a pregnant woman must consult with a pregnancy health center prior to undergoing an abor-
tion. The 72-hour requirement mandates that there be three full days between the woman’s consultation 
with a physician and the procedure. The Risk Factor requirement establishes information that a physi-
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scribed as misleading, which would seem to conflict with Casey’s require-
ment that information provided be “truthful and nonmisleading.”105  The 
ACT was challenged and upheld despite its flaws.106 The court in Rounds 
relied on Gonzales to reach the Casey standard for “truthful and 
nonmisleading” information.  As mentioned earlier, Gonzales seems to 
have moved to a standard that recognizes scientific disagreement where 
there is none, to establish what is truthful and nonmisleading. 
D. Targeted Restrictions on Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws 
TRAP requirements are now in place in twenty-seven states.107  The 
changed standard of review in Casey, from the trimester framework to an 
undue burden standard and the already articulated interest from Roe in a 
woman’s health combined to open the door to what, arguably, have been 
the most devastating abortion restrictions to date. These laws place substan-
tial requirements on abortion facilities, some of which are structural and 
others of which go to qualifications of those performing the procedure. Few 
are medically necessary. Rather, they are intended to make it too expensive 
for the clinics to operate, to prevent access to care and to drive abortion 
providers out of business.108 To date these measures have been most dam-
aging. As a result some states have lost a significant number of their clinics. 
TRAP regulations typically regulate the licensing of a clinic and/or 
charge an excessive licensure fee; single out abortion providers for medical-
ly unnecessary standards; or regulate the place in which abortions may be 
performed such as designating clinics as ambulatory surgical centers, which 
require standards not necessary to provide safe abortions.109 A usual sus-
                                                                                                                           
cian must tell a pregnant woman about the complications associated with abortion and the Coercion 
Provision requires the doctor to certify that the woman has not been coerced. 
 105. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844; the Act requires that information be distributed to women indicating 
that risk of abortion include an increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide and there is a risk of de-
pression and related psychological distress. This information is provided as factual despite medical 
uncertainty as to its validity. (See Julia R. Steinberg & Lawrence B. Finer, Coleman, Coyle, Shuping and 
Rue Make False Statements and Draw Erroneous Conclusions in Analysis of Abortion and Mental 
Health Using the National Comorbidity Survey, 46 J. OF PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH 407 (2012), available 
at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/j.jpsychires.2012.01.019.pdf.). 
 106. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 668 ( 8th Cir. 2011). 
 107. See 16 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7 (2013); 60 percent of reproductive age women live in 
those twenty-seven states (Id. at 8). 
 108. Lisa M. Brown, The TRAP: Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers, NAT’L ABORTION 
FED’N, http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/facts/trap_laws.html. 
 109. Id.; see also State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers, 
GUTTMACHER INST., March 1, 2015, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf (data 
provided indicate regulations governing such things as size of procedure rooms, width of corridors, 
placement within a set distance from a hospital. Abortion providers may be required to have an affilia-
tion with a local hospital and/or admitting privileges or an agreement with another physician who has 
admitting privileges). 
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pect, Mississippi, proposed legislation that required all physicians associat-
ed with abortion clinics in the state to have admitting and staff privileges at 
local hospitals.110 Enforcement of the new law was enjoined by a federal 
judge in July 2012. 111 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the stay 
on enforcement where the court held “that H.B. 1390 admission—
privileges requirement imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to 
choose an abortion in Mississippi, and is therefore unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the plaintiffs in this case.”112 If the legislation had been enforced, 
the clinic (which was the last remaining clinic in the State) would have 
been forced to close.113 Compliance with the legislation would have in-
creased the operating cost of the clinic by $1,000 per practitioner, per 
day.114 Even with such ramifications the legislation was thought not to vio-
late Casey’s undue burden test.115  Other Mississippi clinics had been regu-
lated out of existence by such provisions.116 
As indicated above, twenty-seven states have TRAP Laws and, in some 
states, these laws have resulted in available clinics being reduced to few or 
one.117  Other states where clinics are in danger of being regulated out of 
existence include Alabama, Louisiana and Texas.118 In Alabama, Reproduc-
tive Health Services and Planned Parenthood Southeast brought suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of an Alabama statute that required all doctors 
providing abortions to have staff privileges.119 In providing background, the 
Court commented on the history of violence surrounding this issue120 and 
noted, “…the State has enacted separate ‘abortion-related’ legislation…in 
each of the last four years.”121  The Women’s Health and Safety Act, which 
                                                                                                                           
 110. 2012 Miss. H.B. 1390 127th Leg. Sess. (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-75-1 
(2013). 
 111. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier (JWHO I), 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720 (S.D. Miss. 
2012). In April 2013, the clinic moved for a preliminary injunction to challenge revocation of its license. 
Jackson’s Women’s Health Org. v. Currier (JWHO II), 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2012). 
 112. See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 113. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715-18. 
 114. Id. at 718. 
 115. Id. at 720. 
 116. Abortion Laws: And Then There Was One, ECONOMIST  (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562215 (for a fuller discussion of the Mississippi TRAP laws see 
Laura Young, Note and Comment, Falling Into the TRAP: The Ineffectiveness of ‘Undue Burden’ Anal-
ysis in Protecting  Women’s Right to Choose, 34 PACE L. REV. 947 (2014)). 
 117. Rachel B. Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clin-
ics—And the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Spring 2013, at 10 
 118. See Midtown Medical LLC v. Dept. of Health and Hosp. 135 So. 3d 594 (La. 2014) (affirming 
Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospital’s ability to impose fines on outpatient abortions clinics 
for failure to comply with state and federal rules). 
 119. Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (Ala. M.D. 2014). 
 120. Id. at 1333. 
 121. Id. at 1334; see also 2014 Ala. Acts 441 (extending informed consent waiting period to 38 
hours); 2013 Ala. Acts 79 (Women’s Health and Safety Act); 2012 Ala. Acts 405 (Federal Abortion Opt 
Out Act); 2011 Ala. Acts 672 (Alabama Pain—Capable Unborn Child Protection Act). 
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had been enacted the year before, imposed several new architectural, per-
sonnel and procedural requirements on abortion clinics.122 The Court ap-
plied Casey’s undue burden test in evaluating whether a staff privileges 
requirement posed a substantial obstacle.123 The Court found that none of 
the current providers at the clinics would be able to obtain staff privileg-
es.124 Moreover, it was unlikely that the Plaintiffs would be able to find 
replacements for them.125 The Court ultimately declared the Act unconstitu-
tional and entered an “initial declaratory judgment” to seek input as to 
whether ‘facial’ relief (including an injunction), is warranted.126 
Mississippi, likewise required that all physicians associated with an abor-
tion facility have admitting privileges at a local hospital.127 Jackson Wom-
en’s Health Organization (JWHO) sought and obtained a temporary re-
straining order and a preliminary injunction.128 The state appealed the dis-
trict court’s decision.129 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized that application of the statute at issue would result in the closing of 
the only remaining abortion clinic in the state.130 The Court, applying the 
undue burden test, held that JWHO had demonstrated a substantial likeli-
hood that it would succeed on the merits and affirmed the granting of the 
preliminary injunction by the district court.131 
Texas also addressed its TRAP law in 2014.132 In Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Lakey, the provisions at issue included admitting privileges as well as a 
requirement that abortion facilities meet state standards for ambulatory sur-
gical centers.133  Prior to this case, the Fifth Circuit found that the admitting 
privileges requirement was constitutional, so in this case the challenge to 
admitting privileges was challenged as applied to the El Paso and McAllen 
clinics.134 After careful review, the district court concluded that the ambula-
tory surgical center requirements and the admitting privileges requirement 
as applied to the El Paso and McAllen clinics were unconstitutional.135 The 
                                                                                                                           
 122. Effect. 2013 Ala. Acts 79 codified at 1975 ALA. CODE § 26-23E-1 et. Seq, 
 123. Strange, 33 F. Supp. at 1336. 
 124. Id. at 1343. 
 125. Id. at 1348. 
 126. Id. at 1380. 
 127. Act of July 1, 2012, 2012 Miss. Laws 331 (requiring physicians who perform abortions have 
admitting privileges at a local hospital). 
 128. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d at 450 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 449. 
 131. Id.at 459. 
 132. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014) (Note that as 
of this writing, the court’s order was stayed, see Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, No 14 A1288, 2015 
WL 3947579, at *1 (U.S. June 29, 2015) and a petition for a writ of certiorari is pending). 
 133. Id. at *2. 
 134. Id. at *3. 
 135. Id. at *12. 
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court also concluded that the ambulatory surgical center provisions, as ap-
plied to medication abortions, were unconstitutional.136 
The District Court’s decision was immediately appealed by the state and 
the Fifth Circuit heard the case in September of 2014.137 The Fifth Circuit 
disagreed with the District Court.138 From the perspective of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the state would have a substantial likelihood of success on all of its 
claims.139 It further found that the Plaintiff had not preserved its as applied 
challenge to the admitting privileges and thus, was barred by res judicata.140 
All was not lost, however; on appeal to the Supreme Court the state was 
prohibited from enforcing the admitting privileges requirement against the 
El Paso and McAllen clinics.141 The Court also stayed enforcement of the 
other provisions pending trial.142 TRAP regulations continue to be passed 
and introduced without regard for increased cost or impact on access. Ad-
mitting privileges requirements for providers have been introduced in seven 
states.143 
E. Parental Involvement Laws: 
Parental involvement laws typically require that a pregnant minor’s par-
ents be notified of or consent to an abortion. Some form of these laws has 
been at issue since shortly after the passage of Roe. In 1976, the Supreme 
Court considered a parental consent requirement in Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth.144 The Court held that a blanket parental consent requirement was 
unconstitutional.145 Likewise, in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II) a parental 
notification requirement was found to be problematic but not totally prohib-
                                                                                                                           
 136. Id. at *12-13. 
 137. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F. 3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 
399. (2014). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 301. 
 141. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Illinois, Indiana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and West Virginia. Guttmacher 
Institute update, Monthly State Update: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 2015,  
http//www.Guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/index.html (last updated 3/1/15).  Arizona already had 
such a requirement, but have enhanced the regulation by requiring that the hospital granting privileges 
be within 30 miles of the clinic; Louisiana has enacted a law requiring admitting privileges at a hospital 
w/n 30 miles; the Oklahoma Supreme Court blocked enforcement of its law. Indiana’s law has been 
enacted, although clinics providing medication abortions are exempted from structural and staffing 
requirements. Id.; Specific TRAP  requirements have been introduced in 10 states, (Arizona,, Florida, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York and West Virginia). At least 
an annual inspection is required in Missouri and Arizona permits unannounced inspections. Id. 
 144. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 145. Id. at 75 (The Court struck down the part of the statute that prohibited unmarried minors from 
obtaining an abortion during the first trimester without a parent’s consent. Five members of the Court 
concluded a state could not subject the minor to a parent’s absolute veto without justification.). 
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ited.146  States may institute parental consent statutes provided they contain 
an alternative procedure by which the minor may seek an abortion without 
notifying or consulting her parents.147 The statute in Bellotti included a ju-
dicial bypass authorizing the superior court to grant consent after determin-
ing the minor was sufficiently mature and informed to choose an abortion 
without parental consent or even if she could not establish capacity to make 
the decisions independently, the abortion was in her best interest.148 
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 ( Pennsylvania Act 
amended in 1988 and 1989), likewise required informed consent of one 
parent for a minor seeking an abortion.149 Consistent with prior precedent, 
the Pennsylvania Act included a judicial bypass option for a minor who did 
not wish to or could not obtain parental consent.150 The parental consent 
provision was found to not constitute an undue burden under the court’s 
newly articulated standard. 151 Application of the parental consent provision 
of the Pennsylvania Act was at issue in In re Doe.152 In this case, the Court 
determined that the appropriate standard for appellate review of the trial 
court’s decision was abuse of discretion, not de novo review.153 The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the trial court had abused its 
discretion by basing its determination that appellant lacked maturi-
ty/capacity on her failure to seek the consent of her parent.154 It is unclear 
why the trial court would rely on such a factor when the General Assembly 
in enacting the Act, included the judicial bypass so that a minor would not 
be required to consult with a parent when determining whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicates, 
“The Act states with unmistakable clarity that in order for a physician to 
legally perform an abortion on a minor, the minor must obtain the consent 
of one parent or, alternatively, obtain judicial authorization. Id. § 3296(a), 
(c)(emphasis added). Neither parental consultation nor consent is required if 
the minor is seeking judicial authorization for an abortion, as the Act ex-
pressly permits the minor to elect not to seek the consent of her parents.”155 
                                                                                                                           
 146. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)  (The Court retreated somewhat from its position in Danforth. 
Even though the court held that a state may not impose a blanket provision requiring the consent of a 
parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor,” a majority of the 
court did recognize that a State’s interest in protecting immature minors was sufficient to support a 
requirement for a consent substitute, either parental or judicial. Id. at 643-44). 
 147. Id. at 643. 
 148. Id. at 643-44. 
 149. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 887. 
 152. Doe, 33 A.3d 615 (Pa. 2011). 
 153. Id. at 625. 
 154. Id. at 628. 
 155. Id. at 627. 
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Additional examples of the challenges facing a minor seeking a judicial 
bypass are seen in other of the trial court’s actions in this case. The court 
relied on the abortion facility’s initial failure to provide Appellant with 
printed materials erroneously deemed required by Section 3205.156 Appel-
lant’s counsel requested a brief recess to allow appellant to retrieve and 
review the materials, which she did.157 The trial court was not satisfied with 
her examination.  Among other factors that the trial court cited as being 
relevant to her intelligence and experience included her average high school 
grades and her improper use of English during the hearing.158 
A parental notification statute was at issue in H.L. v. Matheson.159  The 
statute applied to unemancipated minors who did not claim to be mature  
enough to choose an abortion independently.160 Under the circumstances, 
the State could reasonably and constitutionally mandate parental involve-
ment.161 Though the statute in Matheson did not contain a judicial bypass 
provision, subsequent statutes have provided such provisions.162 The judi-
cial bypass provision balances the state’s interest in the minor’s right to 
exercise her constitutional right and the interest in protecting the minor by 
parental or judicial involvement.163  At the state level litigation is illustrated 
further in Illinois where enjoinment of the Parental Notice of Abortion 
Act164 was sought by the Hope Clinic for Women in 2010.165 In 2013, the 
                                                                                                                           
 156. Doe, 33 A.3d at 619 n.4 (Pa. 2001)(Section 3205(a)(2) does not require that these materials be 
given to a woman seeking an abortion. “Rather it requires that 24 hours prior to the abortion procedure, 
the physician or designated individual inform the woman that the state health department publishes 
certain printed materials, ‘and that a copy [of such printed materials] will be provided to her free of 
charge if she chooses to review it’.” Id. § 3205(a)(2)(i).”). 
 157. Id. at 619. 
 158. Id. at 620 (footnote 6 indicates specifically the court noted “That on two separate occasions 
during the hearing Appellant used improper grammar by stating, ‘I can’t run no more,’ N.T. 3/19/2010 
at 8, and ‘but that’s not there no more.’ Id. at 17.”). 
 159. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1980). 
 160. Id. at 407. 
 161. Id. at 409. 
 162. See e.g. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997). 
 163. See e.g. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health (Akron II), 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990) (holding 
parental notice requirement was constitutional because judicial bypass clause provided due process); 
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 298 (1997) (upholding judicial bypass provision for waiver of 
parental notice if notice is not in the best interest of the minor); but cf. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 332 (2006) (holding that enforcement of parental notification law with-
out exception for health of the minor should be enjoined if no narrower remedy could be reached on 
remand). 
 164. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 70/1-70/99 (West 1996). This law had an extensive history of litiga-
tion. The original version of the act became law in 1983, over the veto of then Governor Thompson. It 
prohibited  “unemancipated minors and incompetents” from obtaining an abortion without both parents, 
or the legal guardian” being given notice. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 81-61 et seq.; Pub. Act 83-890 
eff. Jan. 31, 1984). It was held unconstitutional for a number of reasons including judicial bypass proce-
dures that failed to provide for expeditious appellate review of notification decisions or assure the mi-
nor’s anonymity. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1459 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
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Supreme Court of Illinois held (inter alia) that the statute did not violate due 
process, equal protection, or gender-equality clauses.166 
In 2014, parental consent legislation was introduced in 8 states167 and pa-
rental notification requirements were introduced in seven.168 In Missouri, 
the house passed a bill that would amend the parental consent requirement 
for minors obtaining an abortion to require a two-step process for a minor 
who has two custodial parents.169 In Montana, a state district court blocked 
enforcement of a state law that would have required a minor to obtain con-
sent before an abortion.170 Both Arizona and Alabama revised their laws 
concerning parental consent.171 Currently twenty-six states (and counting) 
have some form of parental consent statute in place.172 
                                                                                                                           
 165. The Hope Clinic For Women Ltd. v. Adams, No. 209-CH-38661.010, WL 1198356 at *1 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2010). The 1995 Act had been enjoined for 10 years awaiting promulgation of judicial 
bypass procedures by the Illinois Supreme Court. The rule entitled “Expedited and Confidential Pro-
ceedings under the Parental Notification and Abortion Act was finally adopted in 2006. Ill. S. Ct. R. 
303(A) (2006). 
 166. Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd.v. Flores, 991 N.E.2d 745,772 (Ill. 2013). As mentioned above, 
The Act in this case had a detailed history of litigation associated with it and this particular case. The 
Act was first enacted in 1995, after Illinois repealed the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1983. See Id. 
991 N.E.2d at 749-753 and notes 164 & 165 supra. 
 167. Alabama, H.B. 494, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2014); Arizona, H.B. 2649, 51th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2014); Florida, S.B. 260, 116th  Sess., Reg. Sess.  (Fla. 2014); Kentucky, H.B. 180, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 
2014); Mississippi, S.B. 2138, 133th Leg. , Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); Missouri, H.B. 1192, 97th Gen. 
Assemb., Sec. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014), New York, S.B. 7550,  237th Leg. , Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014) and 
West Virginia, H.B. 2172, 87th  Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014). 
 168. California, 5 A.C.A, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); Georgia, H.B. 242. 152th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2014); Hawaii, S.B. 254, 27th.Leg., Reg. Sess (Haw. 2014); New Jersey, 25 S.C.R, 216th 
Leg., First Annual Sess. (N.J. 2014); New York,  S.B. 1684, 236th Leg. , Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014); Wash-
ington, S.B. 5156, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014); and West Virginia, S.B. 279, 81st Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (W. Va. 2014). 
 169. H.B. 1192, 97th Gen. Assemb., Sec. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014) (One parent would need to consent 
to the procedure and then notify the other parent in writing at least five days prior to performance. The 
bill also contains a provision regarding crisis pregnancy centers. The legislature has adjourned for the 
regular session so no further action is anticipated.). 
 170. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-20-501 to – 11 (2014) (Parental Consent for Abortion Act of 2013)  
The court reasoned that the law was violative of the equal protection rights guaranteed under the Mon-
tana Constitution. Using the same reasoning the court had earlier blocked a law that would have re-
quired parental notification. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) addressing 1995 Parental Noti-
fication Act. See also Wicklund v. State 1999 Mont. Dist. Lexis 1116 (1st Jud. Dist. Feb. 11, 1999). A 
referendum passed in Montana in 2012 requiring parental consent for a minor’s abortion.  The first 
judicial court enjoined enforcement of the referendum and the 2013 Act. The Montana Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the decision on Feb. 3, 2015 See Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, No. DA-
14-0110, 2015 WL 446411 at *1 (Mont. 2015). 
 171. The Arizona law makes it a crime to intentionally assist a minor in obtaining an abortion 
without notarized parental consent. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152A (2014); The Alabama law 
amends the existing parental consent requirement for minors to now require a parent to not only consent 
to the abortion but also to have the consent form notarized and provide a certified birth certificate. 
Additionally the law adds requirements to the judicial bypass procedure for minors. ALA. CODE § 26-
21-3 (2014). 
 172. ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-1 -8 (2015); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.16.010-.090 (2014) (ruled unconstitu-
tional in State v. Planned Parenthood of Ala., 171 P.3d 577 (Alaska 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
36-2152 (2014) (statutes amended by 2009 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 172 (H.B. 2564)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
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In transitioning into my next section on abstinence only education, I do 
want to note that some school districts attempt to implement comprehensive 
family education programs that include teaching about sexuality, birth con-
trol and abstinence. Most programs allow for parents to opt out if they do 
not want their child to participate.  Nevertheless, programs are challenged 
and Boards of Education are sued to prevent their implementation. Such a 
challenge was at issue in Smith v. Ricci.173The regulation would require 
each local district to develop its own “Family Life Education Program”, 
with input from parents, high school age students, clergypersons, physicians 
and other community members.174 The program had an “excusal clause” for 
parents or guardians who did not want their children to participate.175  Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that the Board had established a sufficient fac-
tual basis for the program and allowed it to go forward.176 The community 
opposition, however, illustrates the struggle that society has had coming to 
terms with the sexual and reproductive lives of its teenagers. Even though 
Ricci was decided in 1981, opposition to comprehensive sex education is 
still strong.177  On a more positive note, in 2014 nine states proposed and/or 
                                                                                                                           
20-16-801 (2014) (the Arkansas legislature replaced the state’s notification law with this consent re-
quirement in 2005); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123400 (repealed 2002), CAL. FAM. CODE § 6925 
(2014); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 24, § 1780-89B (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-603-609A, 614 (2014) 
(ruled unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Idaho v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1694 (2005))  (statute amended by H.B. 351, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005)) 
(the amended law was enjoined by Planned Parenthood of Idaho v. Wasden, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. 
Idaho 2005)); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-4 (West, Westlaw through 2nd Reg. Sess. & 2nd Reg. Tech. 
Sess. 118th Gen. Assemb. 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.35.5 (2014) (held unconstitutional by Causeway Med. Suite v. Leyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 
1997)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT.22, § 1597-A (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (2014); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.901-08 (2014); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51,-53, -55 (2014) (See 
Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993); see also Pro-
choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998) (upholding as a constitutional statutory require-
ment for consent of both parents)); MO REV. STAT. § 188.028 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-502 (West, Westlaw current through Aug. 1, 2014 Amend.) NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 71-6902 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.7 (2014); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-03.1 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121 (2014) (ruled uncon-
stitutional in Cincinnati Women’s Services, Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006)); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. § 1-740 (2014) (held unconstitutional in Nov. Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 
2005)); S.C. CODE. ANN § 44-41-31 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7 (2014); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 37-10-303 (2014); TEX. OCC. CODE. ANN § 164-052 (a)(19) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN § 76-7-304 
(2014); VA CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2F-3 (2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
48.375 (2013). 
 173. Ricci, 446 A.2d 501 (N.J. 1982). This case involved a program developed by the New Jersey 
State Board of Education in response to statistics showing that under a, recommended but not required, 
policy for sex education, only 40% of the public school children received such education. 
 174. See id. at 504 (referencing N.J.A.C. 6:2907.1(b)). 
 175. Id. at 504-05. 
 176. Id. at 508. 
 177. See discussion in subsection F infra. 
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enacted legislation addressing sex education, but most were limited to in-
struction on sexual abuse, awareness, and prevention.178 
F. Abstinence-Only Education 
Despite an adolescent pregnancy rate in the United States that far exceeds 
the rates of most if not all developed nations, adolescents here are faced 
with increasingly limited access to information on their sexual health, re-
production, contraception, and abortion.179 Countries in Europe traditionally 
focus on sexuality as part of health education with positive information 
provided about sexual development, relationships, contraception, and abor-
tion.180 A comprehensive sex education program, as mentioned in subsec-
tion E, would include reproduction, contraception, disease prevention, and 
healthy sexual development.181 Rather than focusing on a comprehensive 
approach as was considered in the 1980s, we see a shift to abstinence only 
                                                                                                                           
 178. A number of additional states considered such measures but did not propose or enact specific 
legislation. (In April of 2014 Alaska’s Senate passed a measure which would require that each school 
district implement an age appropriate sexual abuse awareness and education program for grades K 
through 12. No further action is expected as this regular section has adjourned; In California bills were 
enacted  authorizing school districts to educate middle and high school students on dating violence, 
sexual abuse and sex trafficking prevention and requiring the state board to consider  including age 
appropriate content on sexual abuse, sexual assault awareness and sexual assault prevention. The in-
struction will be available to students from grade K through 12 and there will be procedures for students 
to opt out; Connecticut enacted  legislation that will require age appropriate instruction on sexual abuse, 
awareness and prevention beginning October 2015 and a second act will define  teen dating violence, 
require schools to address it and develop prevention and intervention strategies. It will also become 
effective in October 2015; Louisiana’s measure will become effective in August 2015 and will address 
“child assault” awareness and prevention. Earlier versions of the bill would have addressed “sexual” 
assault awareness in age appropriate instruction; Massachusetts enacted a measure requiring materials 
on domestic violence, teen dating violence and healthy relationships to be distributed to students in 
grades 9 through 12. This law became effective in November, 2015. A bill that would have required 
mandatory instruction on these issues for students in those grades passed in the house. No further action 
is expected as the regular session has ended; New Mexico includes age appropriate instruction on sexual 
abuse and assault awareness and prevention training as part of its health education instruction (instruc-
tion began for the 2014—2015 school year); Rhode Island currently has age appropriate instruction for 
grades k through 8 on prevention of abduction, exploitation and sexual abuse. The bill was signed in 
July; South Carolina will require instruction in sexual abuse and assault awareness and prevention after 
September 1, 2015; Utah will require instruction on child sex abuse prevention and awareness for ele-
mentary school children in public and charter schools, beginning in July 2015. See Guttmacher Inst., 
Monthly State Update: Major Developments in 2015, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/index.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2015). 
 179. See generally Ammie N. Feijoo, Adolescent Sexual Health in Europe and the U.S.-Why the 
Difference, 2, (2001), available at 
http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/storage/advfy/documents/adolescent_sexual_health_in_europe_and_t
he_united_states.pdf.; See generally id. at 1 (U.S. teen pregnancy rate is almost three times that of 
Germany and France, and over four times that of the Netherlands). 
 180. Id. at 34. 
 181. See e.g., Rebekah Saul, Sexuality Education Advocates Lament Loss of Virginia’s Man-
date…or Do They?, 1 GUTTMACHER REPORTER ON PUB. POLICY 3,3 (June 1998), available at 
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/01/3/gr010303.html.. 
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education with substantial government funding in support of it.182 The fund-
ing for abstinence only education (also referenced as abstinence only until 
marriage or AOUM) began in the late 1980s. Funding averaged $4 million 
annually until 1996.183 From 1996 on funding increased substantially.184 In 
the 2007 budget, President Bush was granted $204 million for AOUM edu-
cation.185 Federally funded programs were required to adhere to eight prin-
ciples called “A to H.”186 The primary source of funding since 2001 has 
been the Community Based Abstinence Education Program (CBAE).187 The 
communities with high levels of teen pregnancy and sexual activity are 
more likely to be funded with CBAE funds and use curricula supporting 
AOUM which seems particularly harmful and unwarranted. This population 
is especially in need of comprehensive information on contraception and 
prevention of sexually transmitted diseases.188 Moreover, studies show that 
AOUM programs are not successful.189 
Lack of contraceptive information may result in unplanned pregnancies 
in an environment where minors have limited access to emergency contra-
ception. States have sought bills requiring minors to have a prescription for 
emergency contraceptives which should be available over the counter.190 
                                                                                                                           
 182. In addition to the shift in focus, parental consent and notice provisions for minors’ abortion (as 
discussed in section E supra) impose further on a minor’s access to reproductive choice. 
 183. Risha K. Foulkes, Abstinence-Only Education and Minority Teenagers: The Importance of 
Race in a Question of Constitutionality, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 1, 2  n.5 (2013),  , avail-
able at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=bjalp. See e.g., 
42 U.S.C.A. § 300z (b)(2) (Prior to this period the Adolescent Family Life Act had been passed. It was 
the first step in federal funding for sex education and was promulgated “to promote self discipline and 
other prudent approaches.”) 
 184. Foulkes, id. at 2 n.6.This infusion of funds was augmented by President Bush and his admin-
istration beginning in 2002. See Cynthia Dailard, Sex Education: Politicians, Parents, Teachers and 
Teens, GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POLICY, at 9, 10 (Feb. 2001) available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/04/1/gr040109.pdf.  (It was at this point that abstinence only educa-
tion began to be taught as its own doctrine and as the only option as comprehensive sexual education 
became a thing of the past.) 
 185. Michelle Fine & Sara I. McClelland, The Politics of Teen Women’s Sexuality: Public Policy 
and the Adolescent Female Body, 56 EMORY L. J. 993, 1002, 1038  n.26 (2007). 
 186. Id. at 1002, 1038 n.27. 
 187. Id. at 1003. These funds come from the Department of Health and Human Services which 
circulates funding opportunity announcements to community organizations. It should be noted that 
initially “sex education programs that promote the use of contraceptives are not eligible for funding.”See 
e.g.,id. at 1038 n. 38. 
 188. See id. at 1038 n. 34 (indicating for example that 60% of black males and males living in 
nonmetropolitan areas had received no formal instruction about birth control methods). 
 189. Id. at 1008 (Students who took virginity pledges were less likely to use condoms at first inter-
course, engaged in nonintercourse behaviors such as oral sex and had comparable rates of sexually 
transmitted diseases with nonpledgers. On the positive side pledgers did defer their first sexual inter-
course and had fewer partners than nonpledgers.) See also Hannah Bruckner & Peter Bearman, After the 
Promise: The STD Consequences of Adolescent Virginity Pledges, 36 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 271 
(2005). 
 190. Id. at 1012 (The FDC rejected Barr Pharmaceuticals’ application to distribute Plan B over the 
counter without any age limitations.) See also id. at 1038 n. 78.  
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Almost a decade since emergency contraception has been approved for over 
the counter sales, States are still seeking to restrict access.191 
G. Public Funding Cuts, and Support for Crisis Pregnancy Centers 
Since the Hyde Amendment was passed in 1977192 the use of federal 
Medicaid funds for abortions has been prohibited. Despite challenges, the 
restriction continues in force.193 It should be noted that since the enactment 
of the “Welfare Reform Act” of 1996194 and the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (S-CHIP), poor immigrants and non-citizens have lim-
ited Medicaid eligibility. 195  Such restrictions beg the question of how true 
a right to reproductive choice is there if it can only be exercised by those 
who can afford it? Most state policies follow federal guidelines, barring 
public funding at the state level as well.196  Planned Parenthood continues to 
be under attack, with calls for a total elimination of federal funding, despite 
the fact that no federal funds allocated are used to support abortions.197 
Federal funds to Planned Parenthood are available through Title X.198 Title 
X of the Public Health Service Act, enacted in 1970, is devoted exclusively 
to family planning.199 It provides funds to family planning services such as 
Planned Parenthood. 
                                                                                                                           
 191. In 2014 two states introduced bills that would restrict a minor’s access to emergency contra-
ception. In March the Oklahoma Senate passed a bill that would require a minor younger than 17 to 
obtain a prescription order.  This was in direct contravention of federal law and was identical to a law 
that had been enjoined two months prior. . See Monthly State Update: Major Developments in 2015, 
supra note 178, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/index.html. 
 192. See supra note 13. The amendment has been renewed each year since 1977. This prohibition 
has significantly impacted abortion access for poor women. 
 193. See e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the equal protection clause does not 
require Medicaid programs to pay for non-therapeutic abortions); Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980) (upholding funding restrictions of Hyde Amendment). 
 194. Welfare Reform Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2014). 
 195. Although Medicaid will cover non-citizen women’s labor and delivery, it will not cover pre-
natal or post-natal care. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding denial of 
Medicaid funding for prenatal care to undocumented immigrants). The Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act (ACA), 26 U.S.C. §  5000A et  seq., has made some progress expanding health care eligi-
bility for citizens who were not Medicaid eligible, but who were unable to afford health insurance. 
There are states that refuse to participate in the program and as a result there are people who are in need 
but who cannot get coverage. The ACA includes contraceptive coverage but there is an exemption from 
the mandate for religiously affiliated employers. See discussion on Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, section III. 
Infra pp. 34-36. 
 196. See e.g. Ind. Code § 16-34-1-2 (2015). 
 197. See generally S.B. 1510, 116th Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2014); H.B. 1310, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2014); H.B. 147, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); S.B. 763, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2014); H.B. 278, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 1336, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2nd 
Reg. Sess. (Co. 2014). 
 198. See 42 U.S.C. 300a-6 (2014) (prohibiting use of family planning funds where abortion is used 
as method of family planning). 
 199. See 42 C.F.R. 59.5 (2000). 
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Currently Department of Health and Human Services regulations stipu-
late that programs which treat abortion as a family planning method are not 
eligible for Title X funding.200  In 2015, the Senate introduced a bill entitled 
“Title X Abortion Provider Prohibition Act”, that would deny Title X funds 
to any entity that performs abortion.201 Seven states introduced legislation 
that would ban abortion coverage by health plans offered through Health 
Exchanges under the Affordable Care Act.202 Georgia enacted a bill that 
bans coverage in plans offered by the health exchange except in cases of 
life endangerment or possible “substantial or irreversible impairment of a 
major bodily function.”203 The enacted law also codifies restrictions on 
abortion in the state employees’ health plan.204 Eight states have introduced 
limits in abortion coverage under private insurance coverage.205 
At the same time that Planned Parenthood is under attack, a number of 
states are funding Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs). South Dakota was one 
of the first states to embrace the concept of such centers. As part of its 
counseling requirements, a pregnant woman was required to consult with a 
registered “pregnancy help center” prior to undergoing an abortion.206 Such 
Centers have become common in a number of states and far outnumber 
clinics providing reproductive services. The Centers purport to provide free 
maternity services and are often funded by religious organizations. Alt-
hough the Supreme Court has not determined whether a state may regulate 
crisis center speech, a Maryland federal district court has considered a Bal-
timore ordinance regulating such speech. In O’Brien v. Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore207 the Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Con-
cerns, Inc. (The Center) challenged a Baltimore ordinance directed towards 
                                                                                                                           
 200. See 42 C.F.R. 59.5(a)(5)(i)(c) (2000) (Title X programs are required to provide pregnant wom-
en with nondirective  counseling about all options including termination of a pregnancy.) 
 201. S.51, 114th Cong. (as passed by Senate, January 7, 2015) See infra pp. 26-27. 
 202. Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island and West Virginia. See Monthly Status 
Update, Major Developments in 2014 , GUTTMACHER INST., (Dec. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/december.html. 
 203. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-18-4 (2014). 
 204. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-18-4 (2014). 
 205. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST., (Jan. 1, 2015), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf  (Iisting Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Utah as states with insurance 
coverage).  To be fair, two states have introduced bills that would require abortion coverage under 
insurance plans. In 2014, Washington passed a measure that would require all health plans offered 
through the health exchange providing coverage for maternity care or services to include substantially 
equivalent coverage for abortion services. There are exceptions for entities that purchase insurance and 
have religious based reasons for not offering such coverage. The legislature adjourned its regular session 
without approving the measure. 
 206. S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1 (2011) see discussion in section II C and note 104 supra. 
This requirement was stayed by a preliminary injunction in Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Daugaard, 
799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1060 (D.S.D. 2011). 
 207. O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d 804 (D. Md. 2011). 
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organizations that provide information about pregnancy-related services but 
which do not provide or refer clients for abortions or certain types of birth-
control services.208 
Under this Ordinance, The Center would have been required to post a 
sign in English and Spanish notifying clients that The Center did not pro-
vide or make referrals for abortion or birth control services.209 The Center 
in this case typifies Crisis Pregnancy Centers.  It is supported by a religious 
organization.210 It will never provide or refer for abortion or birth control 
services.211 It offers pregnancy testing and sonograms.212 Centers covered 
under the ordinance engaged in deceptive advertising to attract women 
seeking abortions to their services.213 The city was also concerned that lim-
ited service pregnancy centers used delay tactics in an effort to dissuade 
woman from accessing abortion services.214 Although it is unclear if and to 
what extent such crisis pregnancy centers can be regulated, it does appear 
that Baltimore is not the only city expressing these concerns.215 San Fran-
cisco has fared better with its Pregnancy Information and Protection ordi-
nance.216 The ordinance regulates CPCs to prevent false advertising. The 
ordinance has been challenged as a violation of free speech, but its validity 
was upheld by a federal district court for the ninth circuit.217 Furthermore, it 
                                                                                                                           
 208. Id. at 810—811 (Ordinance 09-252 was enacted in December of 2009. The Ordinance referred 
to a center covered under its provisions as a “limited service pregnancy center.”). 
 209. Id. at 810. 
 210. Id. In this instance, the Catholic archbishop and Saint Brigid’s church. 
 211. O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 815. (although it would, however, provide information on “Catho-
lic compliant” birth control techniques)  Id. at 810. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 815 relying on a 2006 report compiled by U.S. Representative Henry Waxman. (See 
Minority Staff, Special Investigation Division, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives, False and Misleading Health Information Provided by Federally Funded Pregnancy 
Resource Centers at 1-2 (2006). (Note that Representative Waxman, the then ranking member on the 
Government Reform Committee, also undertook a review of the abstinence only curricula that found 
inter alia that two thirds of the programs  contained basic scientific errors,  blurred religion and science 
and reinforced stereotypes  about boys and girls as scientific fact. See U.S. House of Representatives, 
Comm. On Gov’t Reform, The Content of Federally Funded Abstinence-Only Education Programs 5 
(2004), available at  http://belowthewaist.org/podcast/2008/12/20041201102153-50247.pdf ). 
 214. O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 815. 
 215. The District Court enjoined enforcement of the Baltimore ordinance. Id. at 817.  The City 
appealed (see Baltimore Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013). Although 
the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded  because the district court’s decision was “laden 
with error,” it remains to be seen whether the ordinance will ultimately be enforced. In 2014, an appeals 
court overturned provisions of New York city’s regulation that required CPCs to tell clients that New 
York city health officials recommend that pregnant women consult with a licensed health care provider, 
but the provision requiring a Center to notify a client if the Center lacked medical staff was upheld. (see 
Evergreen Ass’n v. City of N.Y, 740 F.3d  233 (2d Cir. 2014); New York City, N.Y. Code §§ 20-815—
818.  
 216. See Pregnancy Information Disclosure and Protection Ordinance, S.F. Code Admin. Code , ch. 
93, §§ 93.1; 93.5 (2011). 
 217. First Resort, Inc. v.  Dennis Herrera et al., (9th Cir. Docket # 4:11-CV-05534-SBA).  
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appears that the State of California is poised to enact a “Reproductive Free-
dom Accountability, Comprehensive and Transparency Act.”218 Rather than 
focusing on CPCs and risking a first amendment challenge, the Act will 
uniformly regulate all pregnancy centers.219 According to the analysis ac-
companying the legislative history, “at least 228 CPCs exist in California 
and approximately 2.500 exist nationwide”.220 
III. MORE RECENT CASE LAW AND LEGISLATION 
As a result of the November 2014 elections, both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the United States Senate now have a majority of Republican 
legislators.221 This has provided these legislators with the opportunity to 
further limit abortion access. The newly configured Congress came into 
session January 6, 2015 and immediately turned to this task.222 Within 
twenty-four hours four pieces of legislation addressing abortion were intro-
duced.223 The “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act” was introduced 
in the house on January 6th.224  This bill fully supports the notion of fetal 
pain that has resulted in restrictions at the state level.225  The Act establishes 
that a fetus is capable of feeling pain at twenty weeks of gestation and for 
that reason would prohibit abortions or attempts at abortions at that point.226 
The Act states that the compelling interest supporting this prohibition is 
“separate and independent” from the compelling interest providing protec-
tion based on viability.227  The Act would also change the title of the chap-
ter heading for chapter 74 of title 18 from “partial birth abortions” to abor-
tions.228 
The Senate introduced the “Title X Abortion Provider Prohibition 
Act.”229 This Act mandates that “[t]he Secretary shall not provide any assis-
                                                                                                                           
 218. Ca. A.B. 775 (2015) 
219 The Act has been approved by the Assembly as well as by the Senate Health Committee. 2015 Legis. 
Bill Hist. Ca. A.B. 775. 
220 Id. July 1, 2015. 
 221. Perilous Year For Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 20, 2015) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/opinion/a-perilous-year-for-abortion-rights.html?_r=0; See also Ed 
O’Keefe, Abortion Bill Dropped Amid Concerns of Female GOP Lawmakers, WASH. POST, (Jan. 21, 
2015) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/01/21/abortion-bill-in-flux-as-
female-gop-lawmakers-raise-concerns/. 
222 See also,  House Republicans to Investigate Planned Parenthood Over Fetal 
Tissue, N.Y. Times, (July 16, 2015) 
 223. H.R. 36, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 48, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 50, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 51, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
 224. H.R. 36, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 225. See discussion in Part II A and notes 71-77 supra. 
 226. H.R. 36, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. S. 51, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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tance under this title to any entity unless the entity certifies that, during the 
period of such assistance, the entity will not perform, and will not provide 
any funds to any other entity that performs an abortion.”230 The Act pro-
vides for exceptions for pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or where 
there is danger of physical injury, illness or death.231 Once enacted an annu-
al report is required that shows each entity receiving grants and specific 
statistics for entities performing abortions under the exceptions.232 Using a 
strict scrutiny standard, the district court held that the Ordinance violated 
the Freedom of Speech Clause of Article I of the Constitution. 
Clinic Access continues to be of concern. In 2014, legislation addressing 
clinic access was introduced in four states and enacted in two.233 In Massa-
chusetts, a law was enacted that would allow police to order individuals 
who “substantially impede” anyone’s passage to or from a clinic entrance to 
disperse. 234 New Hampshire enacted a measure that would establish a buff-
er zone of up to twenty-five feet around reproductive health care facili-
ties.235 The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)236 was 
passed to ensure that protestors, who have a history of using blocking tac-
tics to deny access, do not hinder women’s clinic access. 237 The tactic of 
“sidewalk counseling” had evolved during the 1980s & 1990s. Initially, 
abortion providers had found some relief by the imposition of buffer zones 
separating these “counselors” from the clinic patients and staff.  The issue 
of “floating buffer zones was at issue in Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of 
Western New York.238   In an 8-1 decision the Court invalidated provisions 
of the injunction that had been upheld by the District Court creating “float-
ing buffer zones” to prevent protestors from approaching those entering or 
leaving the clinic.239  The Court stated “[w]e need not decide whether the 
                                                                                                                           
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania. 
 234. Mass. Gen. L., Ch. 266, § 120E (2015)  (This law also would allow police (after giving a 
dispersal order) to require those blocking access to stay at least 25 feet away and would prohibit ob-
struction of vehicles. The law was tailored to replace the Massachusetts law invalidated in McCullen v. 
Coakley discussed in Part III). 
 235. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:38 (2014). 
 236. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2012). 
 237. See also, NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics: Incidents of Violence and Disruption 
Against Abortion Providers in the U.S. and Canada, Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, available at 
http://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/violence_stats.pdf. 
 238. Schenk, 519 U.S. 357, 351 (1997). The respondents included three doctors and four medical 
clinics in upstate New York. The clinics had been subjected to large scale blockades in which the protes-
tors marched, sat, lay in the driveways and in other ways blocked or hindered cars from entering. Id. at 
362. The District found that local police had been “unable to respond effectively” for reasons including 
constant protests that overwhelmed police officers and where it was difficult to arrest as protestors 
would simply disperse and return later. Id. at 363. 
 239. Id. at 377. 
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governmental interests involved would ever justify some sort of zone of 
separation between individuals entering the clinic and protestors, measured 
by the distance between the two.”240 The Court did uphold fixed buffer 
zones around the doorways, driveways, and driveway entrances.241 
The issue of buffer zones was addressed most recently in McCullen v. 
Coakley.242 Petitioner, Eleanor McCullen243, and others sought to enjoin 
enforcement of Massachusetts’ Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act.244 
The Supreme Court recognized that “public way[s]” and “sidewalk[s]” “oc-
cupy ‘a special position in terms of First Amendment protection’, because 
of their historic role as sites for discussion and debate.”245 The Court had to 
determine whether the Act was content neutral and therefore not subject to 
strict scrutiny or content based which would require such an analysis.246 
The Court concluded that the act was neither content neutral, nor content 
based and therefore did not need to be evaluated using strict scrutiny.247 
Even without strict scrutiny, however, a state would need to ensure that the 
regulation does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to 
further the government’s legitimate interest.”248 
The Court determined that because the buffer zone made it more difficult 
for petitioners “to initiate the close, personal conversations that they view 
as essential to ‘sidewalk counseling’’’ the buffer zones were unenforcea-
ble.249  From the Court’s perspective, the respondents had not done enough 
to address the issue of the protestors in less intrusive ways. They had not 
prosecuted a protestor in seventeen years.250 The last time they sought an 
                                                                                                                           
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 380; see also Serena Mayeri, Civil Rights on Both Sides: Reproductive Rights and Free 
Speech in Schenk v. Pro-choice Network of Western New York, in Civil Rights Stories 293, 318 (Myriam 
E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds. 2008.) 
 242. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
 243. Mrs. McCullen at the time was a 77 year old  life—long Catholic who had devoted countless 
hours to “sidewalk counseling” before a Boston abortion clinic. See Karls Dial, More Than Words, 
CITIZEN LINK: A PUB. POLICY PARTNER OF FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, (Oct. 27, 2011) available at 
http://www.citizenlink.com/2011/10/27/more-than-words/. 
 244. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266 (2007) The Act originally enacted in 2000 and amended in 2007, 
made it a crime to knowingly stand on a “public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of an entrance or 
driveway to any “reproductive health care facility…” id. § 120E ½(a), (b). 
 245. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 2530. 
 248. Id. at 2535 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). 
 249. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537.The Court was also concerned with the protestors being unable to 
distribute their literature. Id. at 2536  Although the majority of the Court seemed to imagine Ms. 
McCullen and the other protestors as having “personal, consensual conversations” Id. with the women 
entering the clinic, Massachusetts argued that such conversations were hardly consensual and had a 
sense of violence and intimidation. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, 44, McCullen v. Coakley, 
133 S. Ct. 2857 (2014) (No. 12-1168). 
 250. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539. 
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injunction had been in the 1990s,251 and they had not made sufficient use of 
the FACE ACT (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances of 1994252 or anti-
harassment ordinances.253 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby254 was also decided during the 2013—2014 Su-
preme Court session.  In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. (RFRA)255 The dispute 
arose because the companies involved, Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and 
Mardel, believed they were not required to provide contraceptive coverage 
for their employees, since doing so would violate their sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs that life begins at conception.256 The companies at the time 
were all closely held and for profit.257 The mandate at issue in this case was 
part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).258 In enact-
ing the ACA, Congress did not specify what preventive care for women 
was required. Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) a 
component of Health and Human Services (HHS) relied on recommenda-
tions from the Institute of Medicine to promulgate Women’s Preventive 
Services Guidelines that include within required coverage, approved con-
traceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling.259  Certain religious nonprofit organizations, described as “eli-
gible organizations” are exempted from the mandate.260 None of the com-
panies in the Hobby Lobby case fit within the category of “eligible organi-
zation” nor did they choose to seek exemption by requesting to be grandfa-
                                                                                                                           
 251. Id. 
 252. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2011). This ACT allows for criminal and civil penalties to be brought 
against  anyone who “by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction , intentionally injures, intim-
idates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person 
is or has been…obtaining or providing reproductive health services…”id. 
 253. McCullen, 134 S.Ct. at 2524. The court cited other jurisdictions that had addressed the prob-
lem by having the police order the crowd to disperse and not reassemble within a certain distance for a 
certain period of time.  It also suggested enacting  legislation similar to the FACE ACT. The Massachu-
setts law mentioned in note 233 supra did in fact incorporate some of the court’s suggestion by for 
instance requiring an order to disperse. 
 254. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 255. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-(1)(a)(b) (2013). 
 256. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2766 (The companies did not object to all FDA approved methods 
of birth control; rather, they are objecting to four of twenty at issue.). 
 257. Id. at 2759. 
 258. § 1001(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13(a)(4); The ACA requires employers with 50 or more 
full time employees to offer a group health plan or group health insurance.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) 
(2013). 
 259. See http://hrsa.gov/womensguidelines. The contraceptive methods at issue here work by pre-
venting an already fertilized egg from attaching to the uterus. This takes us back to the personhood 
disputes discussed in section II supra. 
 260. See 45 CFR § 147.131(b) (2014) (an eligible organization means a nonprofit organization that 
holds itself out as a religious organization and opposes providing coverage  for some or all of any con-
traceptive services required to be covered…on account of religious  objections). 
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thered in.261 Nevertheless, these for profit companies were considered “per-
sons” for purposes of the RFRA.262 Once the Court held that the companies 
were protected under RFRA, it was not a huge leap to conclude that appli-
cation of the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their sincere 
religious belief. 263 The Court determined that the companies were not in a 
position to avoid the burden because of the significant economic conse-
quences.264 
On its face, Justice Alito’s opinion (other than treating for profit compa-
nies as protected under RFRA) might seem plausible. He says the employ-
ees are not harmed because the employer can self certify and the employ-
er’s insurance would pick up the contraceptive coverage.265 However, Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s dissent is so much more reasonable and consistent with 
existing law.  She points out that RFRA was enacted in response to Em-
ployment Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith.266  The Act was in-
tended to protect individuals.  It was extended to protect religious organiza-
tions serving larger religious communities out of a special solicitude for 
organizations serving a shared community of believers.  For profit organi-
zations, even if closely held were not contemplated nor in need of such pro-
tection. Justice Ginsburg quotes Chief Justice Marshall in describing a cor-
poration as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in 
contemplation of law.”267 It is difficult to determine how these for profit 
corporations hold sincerely held religious beliefs.  Nor does the fact that the 
companies are closely held limit the number of employees impacted.268 
Moreover, the Court provides no guidance as to how it would determine 
which sincerely held beliefs would be worthy of RFRA exemptions. 
                                                                                                                           
 261. Companies existing prior to March 23, 2010 had the opportunity to seek exemption from some 
of the Acts provisions including the contraceptive mandate.  42 U.S.C. §§ 18011(a), (e) (2013). 
 262. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 263. Id. at 2779. 
 264. If they offered insurance without exemption from the mandate they faced taxes of $100 per 
day for each affected individual. This could be as high as $1.3 million per day for Hobby Lobby or $475 
million a year; similarly for Conestoga the cost could be $90,000 per day or $33 million a year. For 
Mardel the cost would be roughly $15 million per year.  26 U.S.C. § 4980D (2013). Even if they choose 
not to carry insurance, if an employed obtained insurance under the ACA and qualified for any subsidy, 
the company would still face fines. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2013). 
 265. 45 CFR §§ 147.131(c)-(d) (2014). 
 266. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Smith involved two members of a Native American Church who 
lost their jobs and were denied unemployment benefits because they had consumed peyote as part of 
their religious ceremony. RFRA’s intent was to protect individuals in the free exercise of their sincere 
religious beliefs.) 
 267. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 quoting Trustees of Darthmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 
518, 636, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819); More recently Justice Stevens reminded us that corporations “have no 
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 268. As the Dissent points out, “‘closely held” is not synonymous with small.’ 
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Even if by some interpretation Hobby Lobby et al. were considered as 
worthy of protection under RFRA, that still does not mean that they should 
have prevailed.  It is unclear how their religious beliefs trumps those of the 
women who do not share their belief and whose health and reproductive 
rights are equally worthy of protection. United States v. Lee269can provide 
some guidance for the Court. The Lee Court concluded that when followers 
of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, 
their faith may not be superimposed on statutory schemes binding on others 
in that activity.270 The statutory scheme requiring mandatory comprehen-
sive health coverage should be equally applicable to the companies in this 
instance. There is no indication that the employees seeking health coverage 
here share the belief of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, or Mardel and if they 
should they are under no obligation to accept coverage. “The ability of 
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation 
has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”271 
The Women’s Health Amendment of the ACA is essential to that control. 
The cost to women being denied this coverage is substantial and expands 
well beyond pregnancy.272 The contraceptive coverage provided by the 
ACA “furthers compelling state interests in public health and women’s well 
being.”273 Providing coverage does not command these companies to pur-
chase or provide contraceptives that they object to. Rather, the money for 
health plans go into undifferentiated funds that finance a wide variety of 
benefits. The decision to claim benefits is made by the employee and/or 
dependents not by the company providing insurance under the ACA.274 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Anti-Roe strategy has evolved from seeking outright repudiation of Roe 
to chipping Roe away, state by state with statutes that push the envelope by 
making the exercise of the right more time consuming, more costly and 
more difficult. The TRAP laws discussed earlier are an example of limiting 
access, law by law, little by little, until one day all the clinics that used to 
provide reproductive services in a state are gone and women who wish ac-
                                                                                                                           
 269. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) This pre-Smith decision is still relied on post RFRA. See Burwell, 
134 S. Ct. at 2804 discussing Lee; Lee involved an Amish employer who believed withholding or pay-
ing social security taxes for employees violated his religious beliefs. 
 270. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2804 quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. 
 271. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.  856 (1992). 
 272. As the Court notes, contraceptives may be used to control medical conditions such as endome-
triosis and to reduce the risk of endometrial cancer. Pregnancy may be contraindicated for women with 
medical conditions such as congenital heart disease, pulmonary hypertension and Marfan syndrome. 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2789. 
 273. Id. at 2799. 
 274. Id. 
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cess must seek out distant authorized providers or proximate unauthorized 
ones. 
 In 1985, Justice Samuel Alito, then an assistant to the Solicitor General, 
outlined this strategy in a prescient memo to the Solicitor recommending an 
approach in the “abortion cases.”275 At the time the Supreme Court was 
preparing to hear Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists.276  Alito wrote “no one seriously believes that the Court is about 
to overrule Roe v. Wade…by taking these cases, the Court may be signaling 
an inclination to cut back. What can be made of this opportunity to advance 
the goals of bringing about the eventual overruling of Roe v. Wade and, in 
the meantime, of mitigating its effects?”277 Later in the memo he finds lan-
guage by a judge in Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti278 useful.  He 
believes discussing the stage of development of the unborn child while not 
“medically relevant” very relevant to the extra-medical dimension of the 
abortion choice.279 Foreshadowing what we see today in terms of informed 
consent counseling, he feels a state should have the right to require that a 
woman contemplating abortion be given information regarding the proce-
dure, the fetus, and the effect of the procedure on her and the fetus.280 He 
further makes the point that “abortion is not unregulable…there may be an 
opportunity to nudge the court to provide greater recognition of the state’s 
interest in protecting the unborn throughout pregnancy.”281 He wraps up his 
recommendations recognizing that a frontal assault on Roe is not the best 
approach. A better approach would be to focus on secondary argument that 
“does not even tacitly concede Roe’s legitimacy, and signals that we regard 
the question as alive and open.”282 
Those strategies continue, with momentum, thirty years since Justice 
Alito wrote those words. The Supreme Court has recognized the interest in 
potential life throughout one’s pregnancy.  The “nudge” has become a 
straight out assault.  Much of Roe’s protection has been lost. Yet there is 
still significant work that can be done. For all of its flaws, Casey strength-
ens a woman’s reproductive right by grounding it as a liberty interest. This 
interest, while strengthening the right to reproductive choice, has neverthe-
less been weakened by the undue burden standard. Application of this 
                                                                                                                           
 275. See http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-1/Acc060-89-1-box18-SG-
AbortionsAlt-1985.pdf 
 276. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 277. Alioto Memo, supra note 274 at 8. 
 278. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1021-1022 (1st Cir, 1981). 
 279. Alioto Memo, supra note 274 at 8. 
 280. Id.  at 13. 
 281. Id. at 16. He also expressed his displeasure with the “mystical faith” in the attending physician 
that supports Roe. 
 282. Id. at  17. 
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standard by the courts has diminished the access provided for in Roe, al-
most beyond recognition. The problem with the standard is two-fold. First, 
applying it has thrust the courts into the midst of intimate choices for wom-
en, presenting judicial manageability issues that were possibly unforeseen 
and unanticipated. The standard is so open-ended that applying it will al-
most always require experts as part of the litigation. Who will pay this cost? 
This open-endedness has allowed for the sorts of assaults on Roe that are 
exemplified in Gonzales. Moreover, in addition to increased cost, bringing 
a challenge under the standard requires increased time, when time is of the 
essence. One example of the increased cost and time is exemplified by the 
attempted and enacted mandatory ultrasounds and challenges that are dis-
cussed in Part II B above. Consider also the women working at a company 
such as Hobby Lobby who are unable to afford the more expensive IUD, 
that their employer objects to and therefore need not pay for.  
  Who will have the burden of establishing that a particular restriction 
presents an undue burden? It is immensely unfair and impractical to place 
such a burden on the women affected. Such a requirement could eviscerate 
any protection that Roe has provided. It would seem to make more sense to 
have a bright line test to guide the courts in evaluating when the fundamen-
tal liberty interest has been violated. I suggest that legislative and judicial 
evaluation of medical procedures that are solely focused on women and 
their procreative choices should require a semi-strict scrutiny analysis, con-
sistent with the Court’s gender equality decisions that place the burden of 
persuasion on the State to establish its important interest free of stereotypi-
cal assumptions about the roles of women, and as well to prove that the 
restrictions substantially further the states’ interests more effectively than 
other less burdensome alternative policies.283   
Courts must also take explicit account of the politicization of women’s 
reproductive choice as they evaluate the rationales for restrictive legislation. 
Laws are proposed and/or enacted to score political victories that denigrate  
equal dignity for women and micro-manage women’s bodies. Roe and Ca-
sey recognized the importance of the decision a woman makes concerning 
                                                                                                                           
 283. The principles governing the validity of gender based classifications are firmly established. In 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, the Court clearly states that “the party seeking to uphold a 
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whether to terminate a pregnancy. Even in the absence of a trimester 
framework, it is a decision best made by a woman in consultation with her 
physician, not one that is dictated by state legislators. Roe also contemplat-
ed that regulation of facilities and their provision of care should focus on 
the health of the woman, not limiting access. Roe understood that the legis-
lature should not be allowed in doctors’ offices, nor should it mandate what 
a doctor should tell her patient during the consultation. It is not surprising 
that Courts have characterized the most recent legislative attempts to script 
the doctor patient relationship as compelled speech with no relation to in-
formed consent.284   
We are at a juncture requiring renewed effort and resources, as well as 
the establishment of a clearer standard than undue burden.  More important-
ly, for those of us who have lived before Roe and understand what it meant 
to be without these rights, we must ensure from one generation to the next, 
that we never forget and that the ability to exercise these rights is not lim-
ited or abolished.  The sadness about the direction in which we are heading 
is that those who will be impacted if we continue to lose ground are the 
least likely to have resources or alternatives and the most likely to be 
harmed. And so the struggle must continue! 
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